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1 Introduction
Since the mid 197Os,  a number of Western European countries has actively been engaged
in substantial regulatory reform. Unnecessary regulation has been removed from various
areas of the economy in which public control was previously rigorously applied, while in
other areas where regulation still remains appropriate at least the methods and the
intensity of regulation have been reassessed. The process of regulatory reform has been
most actively pursued in France and the UK, but it has been undertaken to varying
degrees in virtually all European countries. The poor performance of many public
enterprises’ (hereafter PEs)  has been the main impetus for this reform movement, but
reform has also been pursued to improve the performance of private firms (cf. Amsden,
1994). In recent years, regulatory reform has become a big political movement in Eastern
Europe (see also Domanski, 1992, and Domanski and Judge, 1994).
The growing interest in regulatory reform is based on two ideas: (1) the efficiency of an
enterprise - public or private - is higher as the enterprise is forced to maximize profits in
a competitive market, and (2) public enterprises are more likely to deviate from profit
maximization than their private counterparts. Proponents of regulatory reform argue that
the removal of murket  restrictions, together with various forms  of privatization, will
improve the economic performance of both public and private enterprises and thereby of
an economy as a whole (e.g., nation, region or city). Both forms of regulatory reform
will be discussed in Section 2.
In some circumstances however, it is either impossible or inefficient to create competitive
markets. These circumstances, which justify public ownership or other forms of govern-
ment regulation, are elaborated upon in Section 3. In most cases however, regulatory
reform is likely to lead to more efficient enterprises. Section 4 focuses in more detail on
the reasons for reform, notably improved efficiency and the reduction of public sector
deficits.
1 A public enterprise is a government owned productive organization that:
(0 is expected to earu  a significant portion of its revenues from the sale of goods it
produces;
(3 possesses an accounting system separate from any government agency that
controls or supervises it; and
(ii) is a distinct legal entity.
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While the first half of this report considers regulatory reform from a more general and
theoretical point of view, the remaining sections present the facts. Section 5 examines the
main effects of reform on the performance of now deregulated sectors in Western Europe,
with an emphasis on the important influence of competitive pressures. Section 6 then pays
attention to the basic prerequisites for reform in a non-market economy. This section
draws heavily on the recent privatization experiments in the Central and Eastern European
countries. Concluding remarks are presented in section 7.
.
2 What is Regulatory Reform?
In this paper, we define regulatory reform as all government actions concerned with
procedural, legislative or controlling aspects of economic life which intend to improve the
economic efficiency of public and private enterprises. We distinguish two broad types of
regulatory reform: (1) competition policy, and (2) privatization.
The most far reaching control is of course a transition from a centrally planned economy
to a market-oriented economy, but also deregulation policy (e.g., in the aviation and
telecommunications  sector) is a good example of regulatory reform.
2.1 Competition policy
The notion of ‘a level playing field’ is central to competition policy. Product markets are
most efficient if all enterprises in the market place are essentially in the same position to
compete. In many economic sectors, there is no such level playing field. Public enter-
prises often operate in sheltered markets. They enjoy distinct advantages over their
competitors, such as preferential access to credit, subsidies to cover operating losses and
privileges of tax exemption (in principle, private companies might enjoy similar advan-
tages, but this is seldom the case). These public enterprises are not exposed to the
discipline of the market and are therefore less motivated to increase efficiency than firms
operating in competitive markets.
The aim of competition policy is in general the creation of conditions approximating those
of efficient and effective private markets. Important instruments to abolish barriers to
competition are the removal of regulations on prices, entry and exit, output, international
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trade, the amount of profit companies are permitted to earn, etc. Another instrument is
the relaxation of public or private monopolies (antitrust law). In some circumstances
though, competitive markets are either impossible or inefficient (see for details Subsection
3.3). But even then, competition policy can still play a role in improving the performance
of PEs and private firms.
It is important to note that full competition is not essential to achieve desired competition:
the threat of competition may be sufficient. A monopolist is said to operate in a
contestable market when his behaviour approximates that of a competitive firm. If other
firms can easily enter this market, the monopolist is forced to keep prices close to costs.
It goes without saying that even the existence of contestable markets creates substantial
transition problems to firms which have always been operating in protected markets, as is
witnessed by many experiences in Eastern Europe.
2.2 Privatization
Privatization is the general process of involving the private sector in the ownership or
operation of a public enterprise. There are various ways in which the private sector can
assume the responsibility of activities which were formerly undertaken by the public
sector. In case the private sector assumes ownership of (part) of a public enterprise, a
sale is involved. But a change in ownership is not a necessary element of privatization.
Contracting out is perhaps the most common form of privatization, having been widely
used in the local public services (such as refuse collection, catering, and cleaning).
Finally, it should be noted that there is also the possibility that the private sector will
assume responsibility for the management of an enterprise, which continues to be owned
by the state (Zeuse,  franchise, management contract). Thus, there is a wide spectrum of
privatization initiatives and forms.
In order to understand the reasons (or even necessities) for regulatory reform, it is
important to know why - and under which conditions - regulation of economic life is
desirable. Some principles for market intervention will be outlined in Section 3.
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3 Reasons for Regulation
A major justification for government regulation of economic markets is the view that
private markets can fail to secure efficient outcomes. Under certain well defined
conditions (such as full information, large number of firms, free entry to the market etc.),
competitive markets cause firms to produce efficiently goods that meet consumers’
requirements at prices which reflect the relative costs of supply. At the same time, only
firms that operate on a cost-efficient basis are able to ensure their continuity, while those
operating in a non-efficient way will be vulnerable to takeovers, or eventually will even
go bankrupt. When the above conditions do not apply however, markets may fail. In such
circumstances, governments frequently intervene though public ownership or other forms
of regulation, intending to remedy the market failure. Before discussing the main
economic reasons that warrant regulation, we first turn to reasons of a social and political
nature.
3.1 Social reasons
Historically, regulation has been justified on a variety of non-economic grounds related to
the public interest, such as the need to maintain a particular industry for reasons of
national security to ensure a nationwide network of services or to protect and encourage a
new industry (the ‘infant industry’ argument), or - in the case of banking and insurance -
to maintain the prudential supervision of people’s savings. In addition, regulations on
entry, prices and profits in particular industries, such as road haulage and airlines, grew
significanlty already in and after the Great Depression period when it was thought that
excessive or destructive competition would occur, resulting in price wars, bankruptcy and
unemployment. This claim of instability was often advanced by the industry itself, but
seldom justified by empirical and observed facts.
3.2 Political reasons
In some countries, political groups have used regulation to pursue various objectives,
which are often in conflict with sound economic management. Regulation has enabled
them, among other things, to appoint loyalists as managers, to set prices in order to
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satisfy certain distinct interest groups, to create employment or to foster regional develop-
ment. In many such cases, the motives behind policy intervention did not rest on
economic grounds, but on political power or election arguments. The remainder of this
paper will now focus on the economic rationale for regulatory reform.
3.3 Economic reasons
Two broad types of market failure can be identified which can justify regulation on
economic grounds: circumstances where competitive solutions do not exist (natural
monopoly) and circumstances where they exist but are not efficient (because of external-
ities and information asymmetry). Each will discussed in turn, beginning with those
markets in which competitive solutions do not appear to exist.
Natural monopoly
A natural monopoly arises when the least cost method of production can be achieved by a
single plant or firm rather than by multiple plants or firms. If only one output is produ-
ced, a condition for a natural monopoly is the existence of economies of scale. In the
event that more than one output is produced, then a necessary condition is the existence
of economies of scope (the cost of producing several outputs jointly is less than the cost
of producing them separately). Natural monopolies are most common in industries with
major distribution networks, which imply substantial fixed costs, such as gas, electricity
and railways. In these sectors, provision by a single supplier is the most efficient
outcome, because it avoids wasteful duplication. Competition would appear incompatible
with efficient production.
A natural monopoly however, should not be seen as a static concept that is fmed forever.
Rather, it is determined by technology, market developments and organizational structure.
The effect of changing technological developments can be demonstrated in the broadcast-
ing industry. Here, monopolistic supply, based on a natural monopoly (i.e., the scarcity
of available wave lengths) has been ended by the development of competitive cable and
satellite broadcasting systems. Conversely, technological developments may give rise to
new natural monopolies due to the existence of significant economies of scale (e.g. airline
reservation systems).
Furthermore, the existence of a natural monopoly could tempt the regulator to regard all
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operations of the company as a natural monopoly. However, many parts of such a
business may be competitive; for example, electricity supply includes a natural monopoly
in transmission, but potential competition in the generation and supply of user equipment.
To treat these activities as if they were all natural monopolies would bring about
considerable efficiency losses.
Externalities
Externalities arise in situations where the production or consumption of a certain good has
effects which extend beyond those who are directly concerned with that production or
consumption. The most commonly used example is that of pollution, whereby a producer
imposes on the wider community costs that are not reflected in its own costs. This
particular form of market failure has led to a host of government environmental or safety
regulations or to the regulation of a number of particular industries (e.g., water).
Asymmetric information
One of the preconditions for a market to be competitive is some degree of equality of
information between consumers and producers. This equality is often absent however,
particularly when the good or service being provided has a large information content or is
purchased infrequently. Complex goods and specialist advice inevitably suffer from
information asymmetry. It is the additional information possessed by the specialist that the
consumer is purchasing; thus the consumer faces considerable difficulties in evaluating the
quality of the information provided. The supplier may therefore be able to perform
inefficiently, yet not be penalised by loss of business. Again, there is a prima facie
governmental role in remedying this particular market failure, particularly by requiring
the provision of information by suppliers or by facilitating an independent market for
information to purchasers.
3.4 Competition policy and market failure
In case of market failure, competition policy can still be useful to prevent economically
inefficient behaviour of monopolistic suppliers. In this setting, competition policy
encompasses both structural regulation - concerned with the structure of an industry - and
conduct regulation - concerned with the behaviour of actors within an industry.
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Structural regulation takes place when the regulatory authority determines which firms are
allowed or required to engage in particular activities. It seeks to rule out business options
which may be desirable from the company’s perspective, (e.g., entry into another
industry), but which are undesirable from a public interest viewpoint.
Thus, in order to prevent excess capacity in certain sectors, entry regulation has some-
times been introduced (for instance, by limiting the number of licenses awarded to firms
to operate in a certain industry). Likewise, exit regulation can ensure that a company does
not withdraw from activities that have a social benefit but are inefficient from the
company’s viewpoint.
In some countries, governments have attempted to direct the behaviour of monopolies by
focusing on particular aspects of their conduct. The most common approach is to require
monopolies to carry out their activities without earning the ‘abnormal’ profits that
normally follow monopolistic competition. Since however, in various cases such monopol-
istic profits flow into the government’s pockets (e.g., in case of public telephone
companies), governments are not strongly encouraged to change this situation. However,
the protected nature of such monopolies makes them often inefficient, inert and bureau-
cratic without a view on the efficient provision of client services. And therefore, some
form of deregulation may still be necessary. This will be discussed in slightly more detail
in Section 4.
4 Reasons for Deregulation
As said before, the main impetus for the reform movement has been the poor perform-
ance of PEs.  Later on, deregulation has also been undertaken to improve the efficiency of
private firms. It is assumed that privatization can lead to increases in producfive  e$iciency
(that is, to lower production costs), while the removal of market restrictions can increase
both productive efficiency and akmztive  e$iciency  (that is, to lead to a structure of output
that is more highly valued, given the social costs of production). To illustrate these
concepts: a chemical company that invests heavily in labour-saving machinery, but
economizes on pollution controls, will probably increase its productive efficiency (lower
labour  costs), but reduce its allocative efficiency (more pollution).
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1Both competition policy and privatization are primarily seen as a means of improving the
efficiency of enterprises. Next to this argument, there are other reasons for privatization,
which will also be discussed in this section.
4.1 Improving efficiency
Productive eJiciency
A number of different arguments suggests that the privatization of a PE will increase
productive efficiency. The major arguments, which we will discuss below, are: (1) the
impact of reduced political interference, (2) a change in property rights, and (3) a more
effective financial management. It is important to note that these arguments hold for
monopolistic markets as well as for markets where competition is possible and desirable.
Thus, from an economic point of view, privatization is practically always desirable. The
question whether or not to involve the private sector, is therefore mainly a social one (cf.
Subsection 2.1).
If PE managers cannot make decisions independently of the demands of political expedi-
ency, privatization should improve the quality of managerial decision making. Effective
regulation can remove sources of economic inefficiency, such as anticompetitive practices
and attempts by politicians to affect economic decisions. Such attempts include: social
obligations to provide essential services, sales of products below costs, and the provision
of employment. To the extent that these objectives must be traded off against commercial
objectives, PEs are bound to be less efficient that private firms. In addition, the existence
of private shareholders, who have a strong interest in the performance of public enter-
prises, will force politicians to act more responsibly.
Generally speaking, private shareholders are better informed and more demanding
principals than governments, because they share more directly the benefits and costs of
the way a firm is managed. They will therefore set up efficient monitoring and incentive
systems (such as bonus payments or profit sharing), that will force managers to be more
efficient. It is unlikely that such systems will evolve without pressure from a group of
private shareholders. In various countries, PE managers have been reluctant to devise
monitoring and incentive systems, primarily to evade accountability and retain control.
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In a privatized environment, an enterprise will be subject to the discipline imposed by the
private capital market and the market for corporate control. This again, will force
managers to improve economic efficiency, in order to prevent a bankruptcy or takeover.
Allocatz*ve  e#ciency
While privatization may be expected to produce some gains in productive efficiency, there
is no reason to expect improvements in allocative efficiency. Allocative efficiency is a
function of market structure rather than ownership. In the initial absence of competition,
gains from allocative efficiency can only be expected if privatization is accompanied by
competition policy to remove market restrictions.
This can be illustrated by the following example: if a government keeps interest rates
artificially low, enterprises will be stimulated to engage in capital-intensive activities.
Privatization will not solve this problem, since a profit-maximizing private firm will still
respond to this wrong signal. Moreover, the pressure of competition - which requires
private enterprises to seek out opportunities to make profits in order to minimize the risk
of takeover or bankruptcy - rather than changes in ownership may be a more significant
source of productive efficiency. Figure 4.1 summarizes the appropriate actions and results
in situations where market failure is either absent or present.
Figure 4.1 The reform matrix
SITUATION ACTION RESULT
Market failure regulate monopoly improved productive efficiency
(and privatize if socially acceptable)
No market failure privatization improved productive efficiency
competition policy improved allocative efficiency
4.2 Other reasons for deregulation: the benefits of privatization
Through privatization, an enterprise can gain access to private sector financing, and
private owners may create access to new markets (for instance, Exxon buys an Albanian
oil company). If the sale of public sector assets can be made attractive to small investors,
this will broaden share ownership, which may be thought desirable (this argument has
played in important role in recent UK discussions). Privatization may also spur the
development of domestic capital markets.
Privatization may also benefit enterprises that remain within the public sector. For these
enterprises, increased efficiency will result principally from improvements to existing
monitoring and incentive mechanisms. If a significant number of public enterprises can be
transferred to the private sector, the government should be better placed to focus on the
pe@ormance of those enterprises that it remains responsible for.
A very important benefit of privatization, and indeed the reason why many governments
have become interested in regulatory reform, is that it may lead to a reduction in public
sector benej?ts.  This benefit must not be overestimated, however. If a government sells a
public enterprise, the future income streams of the company are foregone. In competitive
capital markets, the sale proceeds will equal the discounted income streams. Thus, all
things equal, the public sector deficit will improve in the year of the sale, but will slightly
deteriorate in the years following the privatization.
We know that the main argument to support privatization is that an enterprise’s income
stream will improve if ownership is transferred to the private sector because of increases
in e$iciency.  These improvements do not arise simply from a transfer in ownership, but
from concrete actions and strategies that raise productivity or reduce costs. Such actions
can in principle be taken in either the public sector or the private sector, and when they
occur in the public sector they will directly benefit the government. When efficiency
gains are only feasible under private ownership, governments selling a PE can share these
gains by (1) setting the sales price to a level that reflects at least part of the improvement,
and (2) by taxing the higher profits that result. In other words, the sale of a PE has only
a positive effect on public finances if the sale leads to improved efficiency. It goes
without saying that especially the recent transfers of previous PEs in Eastern Europe have
provoked many discussions on the degree of efficiency to be achieved through a transition
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to a market economy.
5 Lessons from Western Europe
5.1 A changing pattern
Since the late 1970s the pattern of government intervention in the economy has altered
across most West European countries. There has been a movement away from public
ownership towards the removal of market barriers and towards privatization. Two key
factors were underlying this changing approach towards regulation. The first is the
growing awareness of regulatory failure. The experience of several decades of govern-
ment regulation has led to a growing recognition that failure is not confined to markets -
governments can also fail (see Button and Barde, 1991; Fokkema and Nijkamp, 1994).
Interventions intended to correct market failure have often adverse, although unintended
consequences for the achievement of efficiency. The second factor centres around
technological changes and a better understanding of organizational structure and behav-
iour.  This factor has already been discussed in Subsection 3.3: governments have become
aware of the fact that natural monopolies are not fixed forever, nor that the existence of a
natural monopoly should lead the regulator to regard all operations of the company as a
natural monopoly.
This changing approach has altered the scope of regulatory reform. Historically, attention
was mainly paid to the rehabilitation and restructuring of individual companies. But since
the 198Os,  sector-wide and economy-wide actions have been undertaken in many
European countries.
5.2 Five  lessons
There have been numerous studies concerning the effects of regulatory reform on the
performance of public and private enterprises. The outcomes of these studies must be
treated with caution, since (1) it is difficult to isolate the effects of reform from other
influences, and (2) it is difficult to establish the counter-factual story (what would have
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1happened if the reform programme were not undertaken). Still, these studies may lead to
a number of general strategic conclusions.
In situations where product markets are competitive, public and private enterprises
perform more ej7cientiy  than when competition is absent.
This means that in cases where there has been effective (i.e., market-orientated) regula-
tion, there have also been efficiency gains for all actors. Almost all evidence concerning
deregulation supports the view that competitive behaviour tends to stimulate overall
economic efficiency. In the UK, for example, competition in such sectors as express
coach services, telecoms apparatus and domestic air services has widened choice, and, to
varying extents, cut prices. New entry has occurred on a number of domestic air routes,
and new routes have been established in long-distance express coaching. As regards road
haulage, which several Western European countries have deregulated over a period of 20
years or more, the positive results have clearly outweighed any disbenefits. Typically,
following deregulation there have been an influx of new entrants socalled incubent  firms,
a fall in rates, and increased level of services and increases in employment.
In cases where product markets are competitive, the pe@ormance  of PEs  may match that
of privately owned rivals.
The reason is that PEs cannot allow themselves to act inefficiently, as then competitive
forces would drive them out of the market. In the UK, again, regulatory reform in the
form of contracting out, such as refuse collection and hospital cleaning, has resulted in
significant cost savings. However, public sector suppliers have been able to win contracts
by matching the efficiency of private sector competitors. The more important influence on
performance is competition rather than ownership. Nevertheless, publicly owned
companies in competitive markets may be hindered by regulatory constraints. Some of the
most successful UK privatizations have been of companies operating in competitive
markets, where management seems to have taken advantage of the greater freedom and
incentives available in the private sector.
In situations where product market competition is absent or partial, the results are mixed.
Competition is the general driving force for efficiency gains. Studies of sectors ranging
from electric utilities in France and insurance services in West Germany show no general
support for the view that private firms are more efficient than PEs in noncompetitive
circumstances. On the other hand, UK utilities which were publicly owned in 1979 and
1 2
subsequently privatized have improved their efficiency over the last decade. All industries
concerned appear to have registered substantial productivity gains, and in most cases the
improvement has been considerable.
In case of a drastic regulatory reform, the transaction costs of privatisation of PEs may be
extremely high (including loss of employment in the short run), but most sectors have in
the medium-term gained efficiency through competition.
There are several countries which have witnessed drastic changes in regulatory systems
regarding public utilities, public transport companies etc. In most countries the resulting
privatisation has led to an increase in service levels or a decline in prices (or in both).
Thus it seems a plausible assumption that transaction costs can be offset by efficiency
gains in the long run.
Expected negative social and economic consequences of deregulation, namely thut sa@y
standards would fall and unemployment would rise, are not supported by expen’ences  in
those sectors where inform&ion  is available.
In British road transport, for example, the search for efficiency has resulted in a reduction
in real wages to drivers, but employment seems to benefit. In the UK, drivers’ wages
were above the average industrial level before deregulation, but have since tended
towards the average, suggesting that drivers were sharing in the rents created by entry
restriction under regulation. Employment in the industry has generally increased or has
declined less than the average for manufacturing industry during recession.
In terms of safety, the record is also positive. Countries which have begun economic
deregulation in either the airline or road transport sector have uniformly maintained and
improved existing safety regulations. Further, accident rates have nowhere increased
following regulatory reform and in some cases have actually decreased, typically
following a downward trend established prior to deregulation.
In the next section we will outline the relevance of these lessons from Western Europe for
Eastern Europe.
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6 Regulatory Reform in Non-Market Economies
So far, regulatory reform has been discussed within the framework of a market economy.
In the Western European market economies, the share of public enterprise output in gross
domestic product (GDP) has always been relatively small. In the mid 197Os,  for instance,
it varied from 4 percent in the Netherlands to 15 percent in Austria. In non-market and
notably centrally planned economies, the process of regulatory reform is a much more
difficult and complex process. Virtually the entire economy has been (or still is) con-
trolled by the state. It has also led to an outdated infrastructure (Jenkins, 1993).
In recent years, many former socialist economies have gone through a process of
substantial reforms. Despite country-specific features, the common basic feature of this
transformation is greater decentralization and more reliance on market forces. Especially
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEEs)  are moving rapidly to transform their
economies from socialist systems based on centralized ownership towards a market-
oriented system characterized by relatively unregulated activity. Within the scope of this
study, it is interesting to point out various lessons these countries have learned in the
meantime. It turns out that essentially there are two basic prerequisites for effective
implementation of regulatory reform: (1) a solid macroeconomic support framework, and
(2) a strong and commonly accepted political will.
6.1 A solid macroeconomic framework
In Western Europe, most conditions for effective regulatory reform have been existent,
even before the reform movement began. Two very important conditions for such a
transformation process are an appropriate legal framework for market activities and
principles and a fairly developed capital market. A capital murk& is essential for
monitoring the performance of private enterprises. Banks and shareholders only invest in
viable firms, thereby ensuring that only efficient firms will remain in the market (Pronk,
1994). Furthermore, it is the main vehicle for the valuation and subsequent sale of PEs.
Many laws that are a sine qua non for competitive markets, did simply not exist in many
Central and European countries (Bos  and O&am,  1994). In a market economy, a legal
framework has at least four basic economic functions: (1) to define the universe of
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property rights in the system (constitution, specific property laws), (2) to set a framework
for exchanging those rights (contract law), (3) to set the rules for the entry and exit of
actors into and out of productive activities (company law and foreign investment law,
bankruptcy and liquidation law), and (4) to oversee market structure and market behav-
iour  to promote competition (antimonopoly law, unfair competition law). After some
period of sometimes desparate experimentation most CEEs  have now recognized that also
a market needs regulation and have wisely embedded privatization in a programme of
broad liberalization and reform.
Another stumbling block for CEEs  has been the enormous number of market barriers
(notably overvalued exchange rates, negative real interest rates, excessive protection and
widespread price controls). As regulatory reform in Western Europe meant the removal
of a few barriers in a small part of the economy, for CEEs  it has meant the removal of
numerous barriers throughout the entire economy. Because of the sheer magnitude and
complexity of deregulation, (which was found necessary to be undertaken), the outcomes
of the reform measures were difficult to predict. Regulatory reform though, has almost
always inflicted severe and visible social costs on the short term (i.e., unemployment).
Most CEEs  have accommodated this by social safety nets. To overcome this insecurity
and adverse effects in the short run, a strong political will is essential. Such a dedication
appeared to be a sine qua non in order to make the step forward to a promising market
system.
6.2 Strong political will
Regulatory reform is expected to bring about better economic performance. This has
indeed happened in former CEEs.  But it was also soon recognized that regions with a
high concentration of state-owned companies were facing unprecedented rises in unem-
ployment (see Jalowiecki, 1994 and Szlachta, 1995). To solve such painful processes,
much sociopolitical will and dedication is needed, as otherwise the societal basis for
transformation will be eroded (Onyszkiewicz, 1993).
Regulatory reform is a highly political process, for which a single institutional pattern
does not exist (Gacs et al., 1993). Broad-based public support is needed in order to
sustain rapid progress. Regulators, and especially privatization institutions, should aim for
the highest degree of support and publicity for their objectives and achievements. Even
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more important is the direct involvement of the public in the privatization process, either
through mass privatization schemes or specific incentives for small domestic investors.
Otherwise, countervailicy powers will delay the transformation process. Broad social
commitment can be built by informing and consulting all interest groups involved. Most
CEEs  have also found it important to design a reform package which is perceived as
equitable for all segments of society.
7 Conclusion
Since the mid-1970s,  many Western European countries have undertaken substantial
regulatory reform. The growing appeal for competition policy and privatization is based
on the ideas that (1) the efficiency of an enterprise is highest when the enterprise strives
for profits maximization in a competitive market, and (2) public enterprises are more
likely to deviate from profit maximization than their private counterparts. Thus, it is
assumed that regulatory reform can in principle be a powerful weapon to improve the
efficiency of both private and public enterprises and thereby of an economy as a whole.
These ideas have largely been confirmed by studies on the effects of regulatory reform on
the performance of public and private firms. The following general lessons can be learned
for Western European experiences:
0 Where product markets are competitive, public and private enterprises perform more
efficiently that when competition is absent.
0 Where product markets are competitive, the performance of PEs - if they are not
hindered by regulatory constraints - may match that of privately owned rivals.
0 Where product market competition is absent, or partial, the results are mixed.
0 A frequently voiced fear that safety standards would fall and unemployment would
rise after regulatory reform, do not find empirical support in those sectors where
information is available.
To summarize these lessons: competition is more important than ownership.
It should be added that there is a variety of regulatory reforms, not only in the framework
of a market economy but also in that of centrally planned economies. Reform is a much
more difficult and complex process in non-market economies. Competition policy and
privatization appear to be only effective when they are backed by a solid macroeconomic
1 6
framework and a strong political will. In this respect, due support from the West for
CEEs  will be necessary for many years to come, a plea also made in a recent study of the
Philip Morris Institute (1994).
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